The action plan released at the Miami Summit endorses a “balanced and comprehensive” free trade agreement and proposes a nafta agenda covering virtually all NAFTA topics2. , the free trade agreement will also not involve NAFTA membership (although the expansion of NAFTA to some countries in the hemisphere may be part of the integration process leading to the free trade agreement). On the contrary, the process of establishing the free trade agreement is likely to be a digital process involving simultaneous negotiations between bilateral and sub-regional partners and territory-wide talks. However, the experience of NAFTA and MERCOSUR (Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay and Uruguay) will undoubtedly help to support the ALEC discussions and create useful precedents for the eventual agreement3.3 Trade negotiators “learn through action”. The North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) was implemented to promote trade between the United States, Canada and Mexico. The agreement, which removed most tariffs on trade between the three countries, came into force on 1 January 1994. Between 1 January 1994 and 1 January 2008, many tariffs – notably for agriculture, textiles and automobiles – were phased out. When future free trade negotiations between the United States and Mexico were first discussed, few people recognized how closely our two economies were already intertwined or how our interests were linked to promoting economic growth and political stability in the region. To a lesser extent, the situation is the same today with respect to U.S. interests in Latin America and the Caribbean. The United States has an important interest in the economic health and political reform of our southern neighbours.
First, without quick authority, our trading partners will rightly question the U.S. commitment to the FTAA talks and our desire to deepen regional trade relations. The United States accounts for about 75% of the hemisphere`s total economic output. If the United States withdrew from its commitments at the Miami Summit, or even spent the closure for a year or more to obtain early authorization, we would both undermine the credibility of the hemispheric negotiations and encourage a protectionist response to the reform policy put in place during the Latin American years – making it more difficult for Latin American countries to maintain and extend the liberalization already implemented. The Venezuelan experience of the early 1990s is rich in lessons on the cost of a political counter-reaction to economic reforms. To date, trade ministers from the 34 countries have met three times to discuss areas of existing and potential cooperation and have set up twelve working groups to prepare for the Free Trade AGREEMENT negotiations in three key areas: market access reform (including the liberalisation of trade barriers and the elimination of discrimination against foreign suppliers in the application of national rules); rules on trade and investment in the goods and services sectors; Trade facilities (e.g. customs reform. B, business visa, etc.).